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The Suitability Rule and Economic Theory*
Stephen B. Cohent
The published rules of both the National Association of Securities
Dealers (NASD) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
provide that a broker or dealer1 in the securities market may recom-
mend the purchase of a security only when there is a reasonable basis
for believing that the security is "suitable" for the customer. The
NASD rule, which applies only to its members, provides:
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange
of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for be-
lieving that the recommendation is suitable for such customer
upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as
to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and
needs.2
The SEC rule applies to brokers and dealers who are not members
of the NASD. It states that
[e]very nonmember broker or dealer and every associated person
who recommends to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of
any security shall have reasonable grounds to believe that the rec-
ommendation is not unsuitable for the customer on the basis of
information furnished by such customer after reasonable inquiry
concerning the customer's investment objectives, financial situa-
tion and needs, and any other information known by such broker
or dealer or associated person.3
Broker-dealers who violate the "suitability requirement" are subject
to disciplinary action by the NASD or SEC.4 Moreover, in several in-
stances a disappointed investor has sued his broker for the loss caused
* Acknowledgment is due to Professor Marvin Chirelstein of Yale Law School who
suggested this topic to the author.
t Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School, Newark. A.B. 1967, Amherst, LL,B.
1971, Yale.
1. Throughout this article, the term "broker" will be used to refer to both brokers and
dealers.
2. CCH NASD MANUAL 2152, art. III (Rules of Fair Practice), § 2.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1971).
4. Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the NASD has authority to fine or
suspend from the securities business members who violate NASD rules, but its decisions
are subject to review by the SEC. The SEC can take action directly against NASD non.
members who violate the SEC suitability rule.
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by an unsuitable recommendation,5 and at least one court has awarded
damages in such an action."
The rules, as drafted, raise several important questions. What, for
example, is the extent of the broker's responsibility to obtain facts
about his customer? Is that duty lighter under the NASD rule than
under the SEC rule?- Does a broker "recommend" a security when,
acting as an order clerk, he merely executes a buy or sell order?8 Also
unclear are the remedies under the rule. May a customer maintain
a private right of action for violation of the suitability requirement,
or is it merely a rule of ethical conduct which does not give rise to
implied civil liability? Although these issues have been extensively
5. Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1970); Mercury Investment
Co. v. A. G. Edwards and Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160 (S.D. Texas 1969); Twomey v. Mitchum.
262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. RPtr. 222 (1968).
There has been almost no discussion of the proper measure of damages in a suit for
the loss caused by the recommendation of an unsuitably high risk. One possible course
would be to adopt a recission standard under which the customer would receive his
purchase price plus interest since the date of the purchase. An alternative standard would
be to award compensation in terms of the actual damage caused, thereby placing the
customer in the same economic position he would have been in had a suitable recommenda-
tion been made. The recission standard provides the investor with the equivalent of a
risk-free investment at a fixed rate of interest calculated from the date of purchase, with no
possibility of a larger or smaller return. This is to be contrasted with the situation under
the actual damages standard which requires the investor to assume the possibility of either
a larger or smaller return, depending upon the way a suitable recommendation would have
behaved in fact. If the suitable recommendation would have produced some return greater
than the fixed interest awarded under the redission standard, then the investor loses under
the recission standard. If the suitable recommendation would have produced the same
return, then both standards produce identical results. If the suitable security would have
produced a lower return, then the investor gains under the recission standard at the
expense of the defendant-broker. The recission standard is thus unfair in two respects.
It makes the investor an insurer of the broker against the possibility that the security
would have produced a larger return, and it makes the broker an insurer of the customer
against the possibility that the suitable security would have produced a lower return.
In order to preserve the risk of both loss and gain for the investor, the actual damages
standard would measure the amount of compensation by comparing the performance of the
unsuitable security that was actually recommended with the performance of the security
that would have been purchased had the customer received a suitable recommendation.
In practice, there would usually be hundreds of securities which it would have been suitable
to recommend in any given instance. Moreover, during the relevant time period thee
securities will have produced a wide range of different returns. Therefore, in measuring
the actual damages, one would have to take the average return of a fair sample of
securities that would have been suitable, and compare this to the return actually produced
by the unsuitable recommendation.
6. Twomey v. Mitchum, 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1968).
7. This possible difference arises from the fact that the SEC rule expressly imposes a
positive duty on brokers to obtain facts about their customers, while the NASD rule
requires merely that a recommendation be suitable on the basis of the facts, if any, dis ccd
by the customer about himself. It is unclear whether the NASD rule means that the
broker has no duty to make any inquiry himself or whether it simply means that the
rule does not apply when the customer refuses, after inquiry, to disclose facts about his
financial situation and needs. See Mundheim, Profesonal Responsibilities of Broher.
Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine, 1965 Dur L.J. 445, 456-57, 473-74.
8. Id. at 450.
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discussed,9 there has been almost no consideration of what is probably
the most important question of all: What is the meaning of the word
"suitable," and what are the appropriate standards for judging the
suitability of a particular security with respect to a given customer?
The federal courts have considered several cases arising under the
suitability rule, but to this date have decided them on other grounds,
without determining whether the purchases recommended were suit-
able or not.10 Neither the NASD nor the SEC has made fully explicit
what is meant by a "suitable" recommendation.'1 Decisions of the
NASD are confidential, and the SEC has merely held that certain fact
situations involve an unsuitable recommendation, without attempting
to formulate a general rule.12 The SEC has found violations of the
suitability requirement when a broker-dealer failed to make any in-
quiry at all concerning a customer's financial situation, 1 when there
has been "churning" or excessive trading in a discretionary account,"
and when a speculative security has been recommended to a customer
with limited financial means.'5 Commentators have assumed that suit-
ability turns on whether the purchase of a security involves the assump-
tion of a risk that is suitable for the customer's financial needs and
objectives.' 6 But they have failed, for the most part,17 to suggest spe-
cific criteria for judging the risk suitability of particular recommenda-
tions.
9. Fishman, Broker-Dealer Obligations to Customers-The NASD Suitability Rule, 51
MINN. L. Ray. 233 (1966); MacLean, Brokers' Liability for Violation of Exchange and
NASD Rules, 47 DENvER L. Rav. 63 (1970); Mundheim, supra note 7; Rediker, Ciil
Liability of Broker-Dealers and SEC and NASD Suitability Rules, 22 ALA. L. Rv. 15
(1970); Comment, Current Problems in Securities Regulation, 63 Micu, L. Rnv. 680 (1964).
10. See note 5 supra.
11. A statement of "General Policy," accompanying the suitability rule in the NASD
Manual, declares that NASD members are expected to deal fairly and to abstain from
fraudulent and deceptive practices. There follow several examples of forbidden conduct
which include: the indiscriminate recommendation of speculative, low-priced securities;
churning or excessive trading; short-term trading in mutual funds; and recommending
purchases beyond a customer's capability to pay for them. NASD Manual, supra note 2.
Beyond that, there is no attempt to provide substantive content to the word "suitability,"
12. The SEC has not yet considered any case involving its own version of the suitability
requirement. AlU of its decisions in this area are in review of proceedings initiated by the
NASD for violations of the NASD suitability rule.
13. See, e.g., C. Gilman Johnston, SEC Release No. 34-7390 (August 14, 1964); Best
Securities, Inc., 39 S.E.C. 931 (1960); Gerald M. Greenberg, 30 S.E.C. 133 (1960); Boren and
Co., SEC Release No. 34-6367 (September 19, 1960).
14. First Securities Corp., SEC Release No. 34-6497 (March 20, 1961); Thomas Arthur
Stewart, 20 S.E.C. 196 (1945).
15. Richard N. Cea, SEC Release No. 34-8662 (August 6, 1969); Philips and Co., 37
SEC 66 (1956).
16. Mundheim, supra note 7, at 448; Fishman, supra note 9, at 248; Rediker, supra
note 9, at 25.
17. Mundheim, supra note 7, at 452, indicates that suitability should take account of
the effect of a security on the investor's entire portfolio.
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Economists, however, have developed a model of portfolio selection
which suggests definite standards, at least in theory, for judging the
advisability or suitability of any investment.16 This article will examine
the portfolio concept of risk suitability and suggest a way of using that
theoretical model to provide additional substantive content to the legal
standard.
I. The Economic Theory and its Limitations
A. Portfolio Theory
1. The Basic Elements: Risk and Expected Return
Portfolio theory divides all investments into two general types, those
that are risky and those that are risk-free. If an investment has a num-
ber of possible outcomes, i.e., if the return it will produce may vary,
then it is said to be "risky." On the other hand, if the outcome is
certain and the return will not vary, the investment is "risk-free."'0
18. The original sources of the theory are H. MAiowrrz, PoRrouo SrLEcn.:
EFFcCEr DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS (1959) and Tobin, Liquidity Preference as
Behavior Toward Risk, 25 REv. ECON. STUD. 65 (1958). Elementary expositions of portfolio
theory can be found in R. BRE&LEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO Risx AND Rrru.N Fnos CoMMON
STOCKS 115-22 (1969), and W. SHARPE, PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL [ARKETS 45-77 (1970).
19. Some economists distinguish between risk and uncertainty by postulating a third
category of investments whose risk and expected return cannot be specified. An investment
is said to be risky when its outcome may vary and when the investor is able to make
some estimate, either subjective or objective, of its risk and expected return. But if the
investor cannot go that far and if he regards the future as unchartable, in the sense that
he is unable to estimate risk or expected return, either subjectively or objectively, then
he is sometimes said to face conditions of uncertainty. as distinguished from risu. See
IV. SHARPE, supra note 18, at 25-26; and F. REmvc, INTRODUCTION TO INVE"rmENETs AND
FINANCE 148 (1971):
Uncertainty, compared with risk, formally means the lack of any knowledge, even
subjective judgment, concerning the probabilities associated with possible returns.
Other economists disagree with this definition of uncertainty, arguing that uncertainty
exists whenever objective estimates alone are unobtainable. See D. E. FARMAn, THE INVEST-
MENT DECISION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 2 (1967):
To qualify as a risk situation, then, an experiment must be repetitive in nature and
must possess a frequency distribution from which observations can be drawn and about
which inferences can be made by objective, statistical procedures... . Uncertainty.
in contrast, is said to be present when the experiment in question cannot be carefully
replicated.... Its frequency distribution therefore, cannot be objectively specified.
Portfolio theory offers no guide to investment choice when the investor is unable
to make some estimate, either subjective or objective, of risk and expected returns, i.e.,
it fails to provide a rule for investment choice under conditions of uncertainty, as that
term is defined by Sharpe and Rewick, supra. The failure of portfolio theory to deal with
investment choice under these conditions, however, is probably of little importance for the
suitability rule. First, investments which present this situation are probably rare. It
is usually possible for a security analyst to make some subjective estimate of security ris
and return. Second, present securities law probably prohibits brokers from ever recom-
mending investments that are "uncertain," according to the Sharpe-Renwick definition.
Under the SEC shingle theory, a broker is held to certain implied representations when
he "hangs out his shingle," L. Loss, Sacurrim REGULATION 482-89 (1951).
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Since any investment is made in anticipation of the returns it may
produce, portfolio theory assumes that investment decisions can be made
on the basis of two measures which characterize the set of possible
returns. 20 The first is risk, which measures the amount of variation
among all the possible returns an investment may produce." The
second is expected return, the weighted average of all the possible
returns. Expected return itself consists of two components. The first
or risk-free component equals the rate of return on risk-free invest-
ments, and compensates the investor for deferring the use of his funds
until some later date. The second or risk component rewards the in-
vestor for accepting the possibility of variation in the return he will
receive. Since investors are presumed to be risk-averse and to demand
more compensation for assuming larger risks, the risk component must
grow as the perceived variability of an investment increases.
These two measures, risk and expected return, can be combined
into a single quantity, or index number, which measures the return
per unit of risk. It is computed by subtracting the risk-free rate of
return from the investment's expected rate of return, and then divid-
ing by the degree of risk associated with the security. For example, if
the risk-free rate of return is 5 per cent, a security that is expected to
return 11 per cent and has a 4 per cent degree of risk, has an expected
return per unit of risk of 11-5--4, or 1.5.22
The "shingle theory" has been interpreted by the SEC and the courts as prohibiting a
broker from recommending a security for purchase unless he has an adequate basis for
evaluating it. See SEC v. Hanly, 415 F.2d 591, 592 (2d Cir. 1969). If a broker cannot make
any estimate of the risk and expected return associated with a given security, then lie
dearly lacks an adequate basis for evaluating its prospects and so is prohibited by tile
"shingle theory" from ever recommending so-called uncertain investments. Thus, portfolio
theory's assumption that the investor is always able to make some estimate of risk and
expected return poses no serious obstacle to its usefulness in the area of securities regula.
tion.
20. This assumption may be unrealistic. Two investments of like risk and expected
return may still have different sets of possible returns, and some investors may care about
the difference. See J.C. FRANCIS & S.H. ARciER, PORTFOLIO ANALYSIS, 201.05 (1971):
Alderfer & Bierman, Choices With Risk: Beyond the Mean and Variance, 43 J. Bus, 341
(1970); Linter, The Valuation of Risky Assets and The Selection of Risky Investments ins
Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 13 (1965). See also pp. i617-19 infra,
21. This assumes that risk is in fact the equivalent to the amount of variation among
all possible returns that an investment may produce. Some economists might argue that
this assumption is unrealistic. But see note 56 infra. Statisticians call the measure of tile
amount of variation of all possible returns the "standard deviation of returns." Tie
mathematical formula for the standard deviation is explained in J.C. FRANCIS & S.H.
ARcsmR, supra note 20, at 15-16.
For a discussion of alternative definitions of risk, see Bower & Wippern, Risk-Relturn
Measurement in Portfolio Selection and Performance Models: Progress Report, 4 J. FIN,
& QUANT. ANAL. 417 (1969).
22. This example is derived from a similar example appearing in Lintner, A Model of a
Perfectly Functioning Securities Market, in EcoNoMIC POLICY AND Tun REGULATION Oi
CORPORATE SEcuRmss 127, 152-53 (H. Manne ed. 1969). Where expected return is expressed
in terms of percentage returns, then so is the degree of risk. This occurs because risk is
assumed to be equivalent to the standard deviation of returns. See note 21 supra.
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2. Portfolio Theory and Adjusting for Risk: The Separation Theorem
Portfolio theory distinguishes between two types of investment port-
folios: risky and risk-free, the latter being composed of the investor's
holdings of such risk-free investments as insured savings accounts and
United States Savings Bonds. The total portfolio is the combination
of the risky portfolio and the risk-free portfolio, and is by definition
the investor's entire wealth.2
Investors obviously differ with respect to the amount of risk they
are willing to bear.2- It is often assumed that the investor's capacity
and willingness to bear risk should be reflected in the degree of risk
of the risky portfolio. 25 According to this theory, a low-risk, blue chip
portfolio would be suitable for the timid widow, while a portfolio of
high-risk stock in unproven uranium mines might be suitable for the
aggressive young speculator. Portfolio theory flatly rejects this view,
which focuses solely on the nature of the investor's risky assets, and
looks instead to the overall degree of risk incurred by the investor's
total portfolio of both risky and risk-free assets.20 The choice of risky
investments, according to portfolio theory, should be wholly indepen-
dent of the investor's risk-bearing capacity. The investor should attempt
to identify that portfolio of risky assets which he believes will produce
the highest return per unit of risk.27 This portfolio can be denoted the
"best" or optimal portfolio of risky assets obtainable.28 He then adjusts
for risk by varying the proportion of his total wealth placed in this
best risky portfolio.2 9 If the risk incurred by the best risky portfolio
is greater than the investor desires to bear on his total portfolio, he
23. In applying these definitions, it should be remembered that the risky portfolio in-
dudes the investor's non-security, as well as security, investments. In addition, dhe investor's
earning potential should be counted as either a risk-free or risky asset, as the case may be.
For example, a tenured professor who expects to earn $25,000 a year for life is in roughly
the same position as a retired (and permanently disabled) investor of the same age with
a life tenancy in United States Savings Bonds which produce $25,000 a year. On the other
hand, the earnings potential of a commission salesman may be more akin to a high-risk
security.
24. This statement is technically incomplete. Portfolio theory assumes that investors
demand to be paid for assuming risks, and that return as wvell as risk must be considered
whenever an investor decides to accept or reject any given investment. Under this view,
investors do not differ with respect to risk alone, but rather with respect to the amount
of return they demand for assuming any given degree of risk. For practical reasons, how-
ever, this article contends that the law should focus primarily on the degree of risk alone,
in isolation from return. See pp. 1623-25 infra.
25. R. BRFALY, supra note 18, at 115.
26. Economic theory, which focuses on portfolio risk, is contrasted with various legal
methods of regulating risk in Note, The Regulation of Rishy Investments, 83 iAt'.. L. Rw'.
603 (1970). The Note, however, does not discuss the NASD or SEC suitability rules.
27. Lintner, supra note 22, at 152-53.
28. W. SHARPE, supra note 18, at 69.
29. R. BRFALEY, supra note 18, at 122.
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simply invests part of his funds in risk-free assets.8 0 The overall risk
incurred by all his invested funds (the portfolio of risky assets plus the
portfolio of risk-free assets) will decrease in direct proportion to the
amount of wealth placed in risk-free assets.31 If the investor wishes to
incur risk at a higher level than that of the best portfolio, he can bor-
row, investing the proceeds in the best portfolio up to a level that satis-
fies his preferences.3 2 The overall risk incurred by his total portfolio
will increase in direct proportion to the amount of the risky portfolio
that is leveraged. 3 The proposition that investors should adjust for risk
in this way is known as the "separation theorem."3 4
The portfolio with the largest return per unit of risk is best because,
in conjunction with risk-free assets or borrowing, it can produce a
higher return than any other portfolio at any given level of rsk 1
Assume, for example, that United States Savings Bonds, with no risk,
return 5 per cent; that portfolio A, with a risk of 2 per cent, returns
7 per cent; and that portfolio B, with a risk of 4 per cent, returns 11
per cent. If an investor were willing to incur a risk of 2 per cent on
his invested funds, he could achieve that risk level by placing all his
funds in portfolio A, earning a return of 7 per cent. Alternatively, he
could invest 50 per cent of his funds in portfolio B and 50 per cent
in United States Savings Bonds. Then the overall risk of his invested
funds would still be only 2 per cent, but the rate of return would be
8 per cent. Notice that the return per unit of risk in portfolio B
(11 - 5 -- 4 = 1.5) exceeds that in portfolio A (7 - 5 - 2 = 1.0).1
This same analysis would apply regardless of the level of risk preferred
30. Id. at 118.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 119.
33. An investment is "leveraged" when it is purchased with borrowed funds, The
overall risk of a total portfolio will increase in direct proportion to the amount of the
investment that is leveraged. Thus, a highly leveraged investment in a risky portfolio with
a low degree of risk will incur a higher overall degree of risk than if the portfolio were
purchased without borrowing.
34. The separation theorem does not necessarily imply that the same portfolio of risky
securities is best for all investors. One man's best portfolio may differ from another's
at any given point in time because of tax considerations, transaction costs, and non.securlty
risky assets. See pp. 1629-30 infra. Moreover, even for one given investor, the composition
of the best risky portfolio may vary over time as economic conditions cdange and the
securities market reaches new equilibria. However, for a discussion of the selection of the
best risky portfolio when the securities market is an "efficient market," see p. 1620 infra.
There is one additional consideration which may cause the best portfolio to vary from
investor to investor. Suppose that the rate of interest on risk-free assets is not the same as
the rate at which individuals can borrow (which is obviously the case in the real world).
Then the best portfolio will vary, depending on whether the investor adjusts for risk
by purchasing risk-free assets or by borrowing and investing the proceeds In the best
risky portfolio. See J. C. FRANC S & S. H. Aacua_, supra note 20, at 126-27.
35. Bower & Wippern, supra note 21, at 418.
36. See note 22 supra.
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by the investor. Portfolio B, which has a larger return per unit of risk,
will always be superior to portfolio A when combined with risk-free
assets or borrowing. Portfolio theory thus does more than demonstrate
an alternative method of adjusting for risk. It concludes that it is more
efficient to adjust for risk by varying the proportion of total wealth
invested in the best portfolio of risky assets than by changing the com-
position of one's risky portfolio.37 Thus, a risky portfolio of high-risk
uranium stocks may be risk suitable for the timid widow, provided
that most of her wealth is in United States Savings Bonds. Likewise,
a highly leveraged portfolio of blue-chip stocks may carry a risk that
is appropriate for an aggressive young speculator.38
3. The Theory of Diversification
As a general rule, the portfolio of risky assets which is best will con-
sist of a combination of securities, rather than some single security.
This is explained by the theory of diversification. Although the ex-
pected return of a portfolio is the weighted average of the returns of
individual securities within the portfolio, portfolio risk is usually not
the weighted average of the individual risks. If all securities in a port-
folio are expected to react in exactly the same way to all future events,
the risk of the portfolio will equal a weighted average of the individual
risks. But to the extent that the individual securities react differently
to the same future events, aggregate portfolio risk is reduced.30 Prudent
37. R. BSEALEY, supra note 18, at 122.
38. The best portfolio of risky securities is that which, in conjunction with the in-
vestor's non-security risky assets, produces the highest return per unit of risk for the
investor's entire portfolio of risky assets. Therefore, the best portfolio of risky securities
may vary from investor to investor due to variations in holdings of non.security risky
assets. See p. 1680 infra. The valuation of property requires estimating the future
income flows which the property can be expected to produce, and then discounting these
flows to the present by some appropriate factor that takes account of the degree of risk
involved. See generally J. BONBERIGHT, THE VALUATION OF PROPMrrY (1937). In practice, the
valuation of an investor's non-security risky assets may prove very difficult vhere there is
no ascertainable market value for the asset in question. Perhaps the best example of this
is the problem of the valuation of an investor's earning potential. Such valuation first re-
quires estimating the salary that the investor can be expected to arn in future years.
Second, it is necessary to select some rate of interest at which to discount these future
earning prospects. Because of the numerous factors which often affect any given individual's
employment situation, estimation of either variable is likely to prove difficult.
59. The principle of diversification can be illustrated by the folowing example. Suppose
investors can purchase the stock of Warco, which manufactures weapons, or Peaceco, which
builds low-income housing. The performance of Warco depends on the size of the defene
budget, as indicated in the following table:
Probability of
Event Occurrence Return-Warco
Large Defense Budget I/S 12%
Medium Defense Budget iV 8%
Small Defense Budget 1/3 47
1611
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investors, therefore, tend to increase the number of their holdings, or
diversify, in pursuit of this reduction of aggregate portfolio risk. Of
course securities often react in exactly the same ways to the same future
events, and to the extent that this is unavoidable, investors will be un-
able to reduce risk through diversification.
Because increasing the number of holdings usually does reduce the
aggregate portfolio risk, investors seeking to maximize the amount of
expected return obtainable at any given degree of risk will diversify.
Suppose, for example, that security A and security B each return 10
per cent with a medium degree of risk, while security C returns 7
per cent with a low degree of risk. At some particular level of risk,
in this example a low degree of risk, the investor has the opportunity
of earning a return of 7 per cent by investing solely in security C. But
if securities A and B react in sufficiently different ways, a portfolio
composed of both may carry as low a degree of risk as security C. The
investor would then be able to maintain a low risk position, by hold-
ing a diversified portfolio of A and B, while obtaining an expected
return of 10 per cent instead of 7 per cent. By lowering aggregate
portfolio risk below the weighted average of individual risks in this
manner, diversification holds out to the investor the possibility of
reaping larger returns for any particular level of risk incurred on the
The performance of Peaceco depends on government expenditures for non.defense pur.
poses, which are always inversely propertional to expenditures for defense, e.g., a large
defense budget means a small non-defense budget and low earnings for Peaceco. The
performance of Peaceco can be related directly to the size of the defense budget, as
indicated by the following table:
Probability of
Event Occurrence Return.Peaceco
Large Defense Budget 1/3 4%
Medium Defense Budget V3 8%
Small Defense Budget 1 12%
If an investor decides on a portfolio divided equally between Warco and Peaceco, then
he can expect the following results:
Probability of Return Return Return
Event Occurrence Warco Peaceco Average
Large Defense Budget V3 12% 4% 8%
Medium Defense Budget 1/3 8% 8% 8
Small Defense Budget V 4% 12% 87
Since Warco and Peaceco always react in exactly opposite ways to the same event, a
portfolio composed equally of both securities will not vary. In the real world, however,
this is rarely the case. To the extent that securities react in exactly the same way to future
events, diversification will be unable to eliminate portfolio risk. The theory of diverslflca,
tion is discussed in the works cited in note 18 supra.
1'612
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risky portfolio.40 Diversification, then, becomes an important consid-
eration in selecting that risky portfolio which is optimal, i.e. which
promises the highest return per unit of risk.
The extent to which diversification works to reduce portfolio risk
is a function of three factors: a) the number of different holdings; b)
the proportions in which different securities are held; and c) the extent
to which the securities held react in dissimilar ways to the same future
events.41
A considerable amount of inquiry has been directed to the question
of how many securities are needed to maximize the risk reduction
afforded by diversification. Various studies, both theoretical and em-
pirical, suggest that the marginal benefits of diversification decrease
rapidly, and that beyond a certain point increasing the number of
holdings has a neglible effect on portfolio risk.42 Furthermore, broker-
age fees per dollar invested, for the average investor, tend to increase
with the number of holdings, due to the costs of engaging in odd-lot
transactions.4 3 At some point, therefore, the decreasing marginal re-
turns to further diversification are likely to be outweighed by the in-
creasing transaction costs of achieving such diversification. Every major
40. Alternatively, diversification can be viewed as enabling the investor to minimize
the degree of risk associated with any given level of expected return. See note 39 supra.
41. R. BREAr.EY, supra note 18, at 126.
42. Fisher & Lorie, Some Studies of Variability of Returns of Investments in Common
Stocks, 43 J. Bus. 99, 109-34 (1970), studied the effect of increasing the number of holdings
in a portfolio for all stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange over a forty year period.
They concluded that roughly 40 per cent of maximum achievable diversification is obtained
by holding two stocks; 80 per cent by holding eight stocks; 90 per cent by holding sixteen
stocks; and 95 per cent by holding thirty-two stocks.
Evans & Archer, Diversification and the Reduction of Dispersion: An Empirical Analysis,
23 J. FiN. 761, 767 (1968), measured the diversification in random portfolios containing from
three to forty securities chosen from 470 of the securities listed in the Standard and
Poor's Index for the year 1958. They concluded that "the results . .. raise doubts con-
cerning the economic justification of increasing portfolio sizes beyond 10 or so securities."
IL BREYALEY, supra note 18, at 124-28, constructed a model of a securities market in which
he assumed that all stocks had the same individual risk, that any pair of stocks had the
same co-variance, and that 50 per cent of the outlook for each stock was contingent on
the market as a whole. He then generated portfolios consisting of from 2 to 2,000 securities
and found that: 1) once a portfolio consisted of six stocks, there was less than a 1 per cent
decrease in portfolio risk for each security added; 2) that above ten securities, there =as a
decrease in risk of less than Y of I per cent for each security added; and 3) above twenty
securities, there was a decrease in risk of less that 1/10 of 1 per cent for each security
added. Brealey also cites an unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Gaumnitz, Investment
Diversification Under Uncertainty: An Examination of the Number of Securities in a
Diversified Portfolio, 1967 (Stanford University). Gaumnitz took a sample of 140 different
stocks and found that increasing the number of holdings beyond eighteen did not produce
any significant gain in diversification.
43. The commission charges set by the New York and American Stock Exchanges for
"odd lot" transactions are a decreasing function of the dollar amount involved; therefore,
transaction costs per dollar invested will tend to rise as the investor increases the number
of securities held and divides his wealth into smaller and smaller lots. SrTAhxAm & POO,
StocK GuiDE 225 (1971).
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study of this issue has indicated that, for the small or average investor,
the best portfolio of risky assets is likely to contain, at the very most,
twenty different securities 44
4. The Theory of Efficient Markets
Portfolio theory indicates that the rational investor should maximize
the amount of return per unit of risk on the risky portfolio. There are
two general ways in which this may be accomplished. First, as noted
above, the investor can diversify his holdings. Second, he can attempt
to purchase securities which are undervalued by the market.45 An
undervalued security is one which produces a higher return at a
given level of risk than other individual securities bearing the same
degree of risk. The addition of undervalued securities to a portfolio
will thus raise portfolio return for any particular level of risk, thereby
raising the level of return per unit of risk on the entire risky portfolio.
This gain in portfolio performance is independent of diversification,
and occurs regardless of whether the addition of the undervalued
security contributes to efficient diversification.
The difference between diversification and the purchase of under-
valued securities can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose
an investor holds security C which is expected to return 7 per cent
at a low degree of risk. Suppose that there also exist securities A and
B producing 10 per cent at a medium degree of risk, and security D
which yields 10 per cent at a low degree of risk. If A and B in combi-
nation bear a low degree of risk because of diversification, an investor
can increase his return per unit of risk by diversifying between them.
On the other hand, he can obtain security D which is undervalued
relative to security C. This acquisition would also raise the amount
of return per unit of risk, whether or not security D lowers aggregate
portfolio risk below the weighted average of the individual security
risks.46
There is, at present, a growing body of opinion among economists
and financial theorists that investors are rarely, if ever, able to identify
44. See note 42 supra.
45. Undervaluation and overvaluation are opposite sides of the same coin. If security
A is undervalued relative to security B, then security B is overvalued relative to security
A. See C. GRANGER & 0. MORGANSTERN, THE PRFDICrABILXTY OF STOCK MAPa= PRucas 9-12(1970).
46. If an investor in fact had these two opportunities simultaneously, information ag to
the co-variances of the securities would be required to enable him to decide whether to
purchase A and B, D, or perhaps all three, thereby both diversifying and purchasing an
undervalued security.
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and acquire undervalued securities. 47 This opinion follows from a
proposition known as the theory of efficient markets, which views stock
prices as fully reflecting all available information about securities at
any particular moment.48 When new information becomes available
which alters the risk or return prospects for a particular security, the
theory of efficient markets argues that no investor is able to use the
information to generate systematic profits.19 One explanation offered
for this result is that there are so many analysts studying the market
that "competition will cause the full effects of new information of
intrinsic values to be reflected instantaneously in stock prices."' 0
If the theory of efficient markets accurately describes reality and
there are no undervalued securities, or if those securities are impos-
sible to identify, the theory of optimal investment choice is profoundly
affected. An investor seeking to maximize the return per unit of risk
on his risky portfolio would have only one course of action--efficient
diversification. Once efficiently diversified, a search for undervalued
securities would be futile.5'
47. If investors are unable to acquire undervalued securities, then they are necessarily
unable to acquire any overvalued securities. See note 45 supra.
48. Theoretical and empirical literature in the field is comprehensively reviewed in
a recent article by Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383 (1970). The literature on the efficient market theory is both extensive
and highly technical. Perhaps the best introduction for the layman is another article by
Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, 21 FIN. ANAL. J. 55 (1965). There is also a
short, non-technical explanation of the theory in Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39
J. Bus. 119, 120-21 (1966). Early work in this field, including both the articles heretofore
cited, referred to the proposition in question as the 'Theory of the Random Walk."
However, it is now generally recognized that the random walk theory is a specialized
case of the more general efficient markets model. See Fama, Efficient Capital Markets, supra
at 556-57.
49. To argue that it is impossible to make systematic profits is not to say that success
or failure in the stock market is impossible. But the efficient markets theory does main-
tain that, aside from efforts to obtain more efficient diversification or to minimize transac-
tion costs, success or failure is necessarily the result of totally random factors. This view
is reminiscent of the philosophy expressed by Winston Niles Rumfoord, "founder of the
Church of God the Utterly Indifferent," in K. VoNNEtrr, THE Smrms OF TrAN 253 (1959):
"I was the victim of a series of accidents, as are we all."
50. Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, supra note 48, at 50.
51. There is some disagreement about the implications of the efficient markets theory
for investment strategy. Two alternative strategies, each based on the proposition that
undervalued securities cannot be identified, have been developed. Under the first, or buy-
and-hold strategy, investors simply diversify efficiently at the level of risk they are willing
to assume and then hold. The investor is advised that switching is not profitable because
it is futile to attempt to increase portfolio efficiency by switching to undervalued securities.
Recent work has challenged the buy-and-hold strategy on the ground that a portfolio
is unlikely to remain efficiently diversified through time, and that periodic switching may
be necessary to maintain the optimal amount of diversification. As a consequence, Evans
has argued that the best course is to follow a Fixed Investment Proportion Maintenance
(FIPM) strategy under which the investor periodically re-allocates his funds so that the
same proportion of dollars is maintained in each of the individual securities as was
originally allocated. For example, if the portfolio initially consisted of equal dollar
amounts of three securities, funds would be periodically allocated to maintain this propor-
tion. Such re-allocation would be necessary to maintain the original proportions ullenever
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An impressive body of evidence has been compiled in support of
the theory of efficient markets, 52 and little statistical evidence con-
tradicts it. The adequacy of the evidence in support of the theory, how-
ever, is a subject of disagreement,53 and for this reason some doubts
there were different relative changes in the prices of the securities held. The FIPM
strategy, it is argued, is superior to the buy-and-hold strategy because efficient diversifica.
tion is a function of the proportions in which securities are held. Under the buy-and-hold
strategy, a portfolio which was initially diversified efficiently may become less well-
diversified over time with changes in the original proportions of the securities. See
Evans, An Analysis of Portfolio Maintenance Strategies, 25 J. FIN. 561 (1970); Evans, Tie
Random Walk Hypothesis, Portfolio Analysis and the Buy and Hold Criterion, III J. FIN.
& QuANT. AN.AL. 327 (1968).
The FIPM strategy is superior to buy-and-hold only if the transaction costs incurred it
maintaining original securities proportions are more than offset by the increase in effilcent
diversification. In the first article cited above, Evans conducted a comparatve test of both
strategies for 23,870 portfolios generated at random from the Standard and Poor's Index
from 1958-1967. His results indicate that the FIPM strategy will equal or surpass the buy-
and-hold for those investors who either pay capital gains tax at a rate of no more then
15 per cent or hold at least $2500 worth of securities. In making his computations, Evans
assumed that dividends paid would not be consumed and would be reinvested. Therefore,
in computing results for the buy-and-hold strategy, dividends paid were used to purchase
additional shares of the stock on which they had been paid. In computing results for the
FIPM strategy, the dividends paid were used to maintain original securities proportions.
Evans' results overstate the case for the FIPM strategy because of this assumption with
respect to the use of dividends. Many investors consume at least part of their dividends,
and these investors would be forced to incur considerably higher transactions costs In
pursuit of the FIPM strategy than those investors who are able to reinvest their dividends.
The FIPM strategy assumes that 1) the original set of portfolio proportions was optimal
and remains optimal and 2) co-variances of securities remain unchanged through time.
If these assumptions are unjustified, then some other investment strategy may be superior
to both buy-and-hold and FIPM.
52. Although this article cannot present all the evidence offered in support of the theory
of efficient markets, one of the most important studies deserves mention. The Wharton
Study examined the performance of mutual funds for the period from 1951 to 1962 and
found that
the average performance of mutual funds was not appreciably better than what would
have been achieved by a completely unmanaged portfolio with the same distribution
between common stocks and other assets. About half the funds performed better and
half worse than such an unmanaged portfolio. This analysis also revealed the absence
of any significant relationship between performance and turnover [i.e., switching].
These results imply that fund shareholders did not benefit from high turnover.
The mutual funds studied engaged in substantial switching while the randomly chosen
portfolios were simply held for the period under consideration. Since mutual funds are
reputedly able to buy the best investment advice, they should be able to identify and
acquire undervalued securities if it is possible. However, 
mutual funds appear to h ve
performed no better than random. See generally WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANc E AND Co.%I-
ER~CE, A STUDY OF MUTUAL FUNDS (1962). The summary of this study is taken from
I. FRIEND, . LUME & j. CRocKEr, MUTUAL FUNDS AND OTER INSTITUTIONAL INVlhTOIS
(1970). Other studies of mutual funds have produced similar results indicating that mutualfund manager  are unable to identify and acquire undervalued securities. See, c.g., lesen,
Risk, the Pricing of Capital Assets, and the Evaluation of Investment Portfolios, 42
J. Bus. 167 (1969); Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1915-61, 23
J. FIN. 389 (1968); Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. Bus. 119 (1966).
53. After summarizing the empirical evidence offered in support of the efficient markets
hypothesis, Fama concludes that
in short, the evidence in support of the efficient markets model is extensive and
(somewhat uniquely in economics) contradictory evidence is sparse. Nevertheless, we
certainly do not want to leave the impression that all issues are closed.
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 48, at 422.
The efficient markets theory is sometimes stated in three different forms depending on
the extent to which market prices are believed to reflect available information. The weak
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remain as to the theory's validity. Should the proposition that it is
impossible to identify and acquire undervalued securities become ade-
quately established,54 the theory of efficient markets will have a strong
daim for integration into the legal suitability standardra5
B. Integration of Economic Theoty Into the Legal Standard
In the abstract world of economic models, the selection of the most
suitable investment appears easy. The investor simply chooses the risky
portfolio with the highest return per unit of risk and then divides his
wealth between the best portfolio and risk-free assets in proportions
that reflect his willingness to incur risk. Yet there are minor theoretical
and major practical objections to an attempt simply to transform the
theoretical model into a legal rule. These objections do not, however,
prevent portfolio theory from making a major contribution to a sub-
stantive rule of suitability.
1. Restrictive Assumptions of Portfolio Theory
Portfolio theory is premised on a number of restrictive assumptions
which at first appear to conflict with reality and thus to threaten the
feasibility of building a legal rule on the theory50 Such objections,
however, prove to be of little practical importance.
form postulates that it is impossible to identify and acquire undervalued securities on
the basis of information concerning past price performance. The semi-strong form states
that this is also true for all publicly available information. Finally. the strong form
states that no investors have access to non-public information which they can uwe to
identify and acquire undervalued securities. The empirical evidence supports both the
weak and semi-strong forms of the efficient markets theory, while the studies have produced
evidence inconsistent with the strong form. See generally Fama, supra note 48 and note 54
infra.
54. Economists have noted two minor deviations from the efficient markets model.
First, specialists on the major security exchanges sometimes have monopolistic access to
information on unexecuted orders which may be used to generate trading profits. See
Niederhoffer : Osborne, Market Making and Reversal on the Stock Exchange, 61 J. Ass.
STAT. Ass'N 897 (1966). Second, there is evidence that corporate insiders may have
monopolistic access to information about their own firms which indicates that its stock is
misvalued by the market. See M. Scholes, A Test of the Competitive Hypothesis: The
Market for New Issues and Secondary Offerings, 1969 (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Graduate
School of Business, University of Chicago). However, these deviations are unimportant
for the overwhelming proportion of the investment community. As Fama has written:
At the moment ... corporate insiders and specialists are the only two groups whose
monopolistic access to information has been documented. There is no evidence that
deviation from . . . the efficient markets model permeate any further down the
investment community.
Fama. Efficient Capital Markets, supra note 48, at 415. See note 53 supra.
55. See note 53 supra.
56. A recent treatise states that portfolio theory is based on the following assumptions:
1. All investors visualize assets as probability distributions of expected returns over
some holding period.
2. Investors' risk estimates are proportional to the variability of expected returns.
3. Investors are willing to base their decisions solely in terms of expected return
and risk ....
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The first questionable assumption is that all investment decisions
can be made on the basis of two measures: risk and expected returns.
Two investments may share the same risk and expected return while
having different patterns of possible returns. Statisticians have devel-
oped two variables, skewness and kurtosis, to describe differences
in the patterns of returns. 57 To the extent that investors care about
the skewness or kurtosis of alternative investment opportunities, por-
4. For any given level of risk, investors prefer higher returns to lower returns ....
Or, conversely, for any given level of rate of return, investors prefer less risk over
more risk.
J.C. FRANCIS & S.H. ARCHER, supra note 20, at 7.
To the above, I would add the following assumption:
5. Assets which are entirely risk-free do exist.
The theory of portfolio selection discussed at TAN 19-55 supra, can be deduced entirely
from these five axioms. The text of this article discusses only assumptions 3 and 5,
since it is only these assumptions which may, in the author's opinion, involve a signiflcant
departure from "reality." Assumption 1 is equivalent to assuming that investors can always
make some estimate, either subjective or objective, of the risk and expected return of an
investment. The consequences for portfolio theory when this is not the case are minimal,
and are discussed in note 19 supra.
Assumption 2 is equivalent to defining "risk" as the amount of variability in the
possible outcomes of an investment. This was assumed to be the proper definition of risk
on TAN 21 supra. However, this definition can be attacked on the ground that investors are
concerned primarily with the risk of loss alone, rather than with variation over the whole
range of possible outcomes. For example, Francis and Archer note,
[tJhe risk definition given in assumption two does not conform to risk measures com-
piled by some popular financial services. The published quality ratings seem Im-
plicitly to define risk to be the probability of default.
J. C. FRANCIS & S. H. ARCHER, supra, at 8. However, if the risk of loss or probability of
default is highly correlated with the variability of return, then assumption 2 would
appear to be valid. There will be a high correlation between the variability of all possible
returns and the risk of loss, if the distributions of security returns are nearly symmetric.
And, "most studies published thus far indicate [that) the distribution of (security] returns
are symmetric." J. C. FRANCIS & S. H. ARCHER, supra, at 16. Therefore, assumption 2 Is
probably justified. The studies which indicate that the distributions of security returns
are nearly symmetric are cited in note 59 infra.
The first part of assumption 4 is equivalent to saying that people will generally prefer
more money, all other things being equal. If this is not an accurate description of reality,
then it is difficult to know what is. The second part of assumption 4 is a little more con-
troversial. There may be individuals who are inveterate gamblers and will prefer higher
risks to lower risks, even if the returns are the same, because of the pleasure they obtain
from risk-taking per se. Inveterate gamblers, however, usually go to the race track or
Las Vegas to satisfy their needs. The typical investor in securities who needs the pro-
tection of the suitability rule is undoubtedly risk-averse.
There are some economists who reject entirely the notion that it is meaningful to speak
of the axioms of a theory as being "realistic" or "unrealistic." They argue that the only
possible test of a theory is "predictability," i.e., the accuracy of its predictions. According
to the "predictivist thesis," one theory is rejected in favor of a second theory whenever the
second theory produces more accurate predictions than the first. See Friedman, The
Methodology of Positive Economics, in M. FRaEDMAN, ESSAYS IN PosrrIvE ECONOMICS (190),
However, it is not possible to use this standard insofar as portfolio theory Is concerned,
because there is really no other competing theory with which to compare its predictions.
When the predictivist thesis cannot be used, the decision to reject or accept a
theory may require a consideration of the "reality" of its axioms. See 8. ToULMIN, FORE-
SIGHT AND UNDERSTANDING: AN INQUIRY INTO THE AMis OF SCIENCE (1961).
57. The mathematical formulas for skewness and kurtosis are set out briefly in J.C,
FRAtCIs & S.H. ARCHmR, supra note 20, at 202-03.
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folio theory fails to take account of investor preferences. 8 As a prac-
tical matter, however, this theoretical imperfection is effectively mooted,
for neither investors nor brokers are normally able to incorporate pref-
erences as to skewness or kurtosis into their investment decisions.53
The second questionable assumption of portfolio theory is that risk-
free assets exist. It may be argued, however, that even those investments
typically regarded as risk-free, such as United States Savings Bonds and
insured savings accounts, are in fact subject to inflation risk. This arti-
cle adopts the contrary view, that the inflation risk of savings accounts
and government bonds is insignificant, and develops a set of suitability
rules based on the existence of risk-free assets. Investment choice is
thus guided by the separation theorem, with a suitable risk level ob-
tained through adjustments in the proportion of money invested in
58. See note 20 supra.
59. On a theoretical level, the introduction of skewness and kurtosis only makes port.
folio theory as we have discussed it incomplete. They could be incorporated into the model
by denoting as rational an investment choice which rejects a portfolio withd the highest
return per unit of risk in favor of a risky portfolio with a lower return per unit of risk
where the skew and kurtosis characteristics of the second portfolio are sufidently ad-
vantageous to outweigh the sacrifice in yield.
A strong argument for ignoring both variables is that, as a practical matter, it is
usually impossible to identify or predict the skew or kurtosis characteristics of particular
investments. In order to calculate them, the investor must be able to specify in some
detail the set of possible returns the investment may be expected to produce. This rEt of
possible returns is known as a probability of frequency distribution, and consists of each
possible return the investment might produce and the probability of occurrence a..odated
with each possible return. In practice, investors are rarely, if ever, able to specify a
complete probability distribution for each investment they are considering. Usually the
investor simply makes some estimate of the degree of rsk and the amount of return
which he expects the security to produce. Although he can guess at the amount of .-aria-
tion in the returns (the risk), he usually has no basis for specifying in detail the proba-
bility distribution. The fact that investors estimate risk and expected return in this way
is not inconsistent with the assumption of portfolio theory that investors are able to
visualize assets as probability distributions of expected returns. See note 56 supra;
J. C. FRANcis & S. H. ARCHER, supra note 20, at 8:
[V]isualizing probability distributions need not be explicit. "Most likely" estimates
are undoubtedly prepared either explicitly or implicitly from a subjective probability
distribution.
Moreover, even if investors were able to estimate skewness and kurtosis, they would
probably ignore both variables. First, a large number of statistical studies show that, at
least historically, distributions of security returns are approximately symmetrical, -which
is to say, all have zero skewness. See Osborne, Brownian Motion in the Stock Market,
II OPRAnaoNS RESEARCH 145 (1959); Blume, Portfolio Theory: A Step Toward Its
Practical Application, 43 J. Bus. 163 (1970); Fama, Behavior of Stoch Market Prices, 38
J. Bus. 34 (1965); Kendall, Analysis of Economic Time Series, I: Prices, J. ROYAL STAT. So.
11 (1953). But for evidence of deviations from symmetry, see Mandelbrot, The Variation
of Certain Speculative Prices, 34 J. Bus. 392 (1963).
As for kurtosis, there is some question as to what it means and exactly what it measures,
even when it can be estimated. In J. C. FRANcis & S. H. ARcHER, supra note 20, at 212, the
authors state, "[li]t is not entirely clear what fourth moments [k'urtosis] measure or how
they affect investor utility." Thus, most investors would probably ignore the fourth
moments even if they were known. See also Kaplansky, A Common Error Concerning
Kurtosis, 40 A.m. STAT. ASS'N J. 259 (1945).
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the risk-free portfolio. If a broker or investor is of the view that risk-
free assets do not exist, an appropriate adjustment to the rules devel-
oped in this article can be made.60 In either case, the basic contribution
of portfolio theory, which is to focus attention on the entire portfolio
rather than on any single security, is unimpaired.
2. Practical Problems
The most serious objection to implementing a suitability rule
premised on portfolio theory is the difficulty of identifying the optimal
portfolio of risky assets, a difficulty which would be compounded if
this determination were to be attempted after the fact by a court. If
the theory of efficient markets is accepted, this problem is greatly
reduced, since under that theory all efficiently diversified portfolios
of a particular degree of risk offer the same expected return,01 Recom-
mendations would then be examined in only two relatively simple ways:
to discover whether more efficient diversification was achieved, and
whether the resultant risk was appropriate for the customer.
If we do not accept the efficient markets theory, there is no objective
way of determining in advance which risky portfolio will be the
uniquely defined optimum. 62 Nor can the best portfolio be pinpointed
60. Such an adjustment is made in the footnotes accompanying the rules developed In
Part II. See notes 73 and 79 infra. Some brokers and investors may believe that risk-free
assets do not exist, viewing the inflation risk incurred~by United States Savings Bonds and
insured savings accounts as too significant to be ignored. If there are no risk-free
assets, all possible investments fall into the risky portfolio and the separation theoren
becomes an empty shell. Portfolio theory in that case would still focus on an in-
vestor's entire portfolio in considering a particular investment. A suitable level of
risk would be achieved not by varying the proportions invested in risky and risk.free
portfolios, however, but by adjusting the risky portfolio itself. The investor would choose
that risky portfolio with the highest return at the desired level of risk. See J. C. FRANC19
& S. H. ARCHER, supra note 20, at 130-31.
61. See Sharpe, Mutual Fund Performance, 39 J. Bus. 119, at 121:
In a perfect capital market, any properly diversified portfolio will be efficient.
the . . .[investor) must select from among alternative diversified portfolios the one
with the appropriate degree of risk.
62. The best portfolio is selected by evaluating the risk and return to be expected front
all possible combinations of securities. There are two basic methods of making tils
evaluation. If it is believed that a security's risk and expected return in the future will not
differ from what they have been in the past, then its future performance is said to be
susceptible of "objective" derivation on the basis of empirical evidence of past behavior.
On the other hand, if it is believed that the future may differ from the past, then thLe
future performance is said to be "subjectively" specified, since it cannot be based on
objective historical results.
But even the so-called objective evaluation is subjective. Its use of objective standards
is founded on the subjective belief that the future will not materially differ front the
past. Therefore, both methods involve subjective elements, and there is no way of making
a truly objective determination of the best portfolio. See J. C. FRANCIS & S. H. Acurt,
s'upra note 20, at 35 on the estimation of risk and expected return:
The security analyst could obtain these inputs from historical data. Or, he can sub.
jectively estimate these inputs. If the historical data are accurate and conditions in te
future are expected to resemble those in the period in whid the data were derived,
the historical data may be the best estimate of the future, But if the analyst is
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on the basis of subjective business judgment and informed opinion.
Financial analysts can often concur as to the general degree of risk that
can reasonably be expected from any particular portfolio. On the basis
of such a consensus established by expert testimony, an adjudicatory
body could determine whether a portfolio was of the general degree of
risk appropriate for the customer. But analysts often disagree about a
portfolio's exact placement within a general class. For example, most
analysts would agree that both American Telephone & Telegraph and
General Motors stocks carry a relatively low degree of risk, but they
would often disagree as to which of the two, within that general class,
can be expected to be less risky. The situation is similar with respect
to determination of expected returns.
Selection of the optimal portfolio, however, requires considerably
more than simple placement of a portfolio within a general class. Opti-
mization refers to a single best portfolio to be selected from a broad
range of possibilities on the basis of its return per unit of risk. Because
analysts will be unable to reach a consensus on the ranking of all alter-
native portfolios, they will necessarily disagree widely about which
portfolio is, at a moment in time, optimal. A workable suitability rule
thus could not impose on a broker or dealer the obligation of recom-
mending the optimal risky portfolio.
3. Investor Preferences and Legal Suitability
Portfolio theory seeks to equate total portfolio risk with the level of
risk that the investor is willing to bear. It focuses, in other words, on
the risk preferences, or the willingness to bear risk, of the individual
investor. Mundheim suggests that the legal suitability standard should
go further, and consider, in addition, whether the risk is one which
the investor has the capacity or ability to bear, notwithstanding cus-
tomer preferences and desires:
The principal aim of these procedures should be a definition of
each customer's risk threshold. The risk threshold concept is
broader than the concept of investment objective. Investment ob-
jective expresses what the customer wishes to achieve from his in-
vestment in relation to his willingness to bear risk. Risk threshold
refers to the customer's willingness and ability to bear risk.0
Ability or capacity to bear risk, or risk threshold, are terms which
"expert" or the market is changing, subjective estimates may be preferable to his.
torical data.
See also Sharpe, supra note 18, at 25.
63. Mundheim, supra note 7, at 474 (emphasis added).
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refer to that amount of risk which a prudent investor, in the customer's
circumstances, would be willing to incur. A widow with a moderate
amount of capital, for example, might be anxious to speculate and to
incur high risks. But such speculation would be beyond her ability or
capacity to bear risk if a prudent investor in her situation would not
adopt that strategy.
It is not proposed that the law absolutely prohibit a broker from
selling a security which would raise portfolio risk above the risk thresh-
old. If an investor persisted in requesting such a security, a capacity-
to-bear-risk standard would permit the broker to make the sale,
provided that he first warn the investor that the purchase was danger.
ous and imprudent.64
This notion of risk threshold, requiring brokers to warn customers
about purchases which would result in imprudent levels of risk, would
increase the flow of information available to the investor and protect
against the hazards of high-pressure security salesmanship. Investment
in securities can be fantastically complicated and technical for the lay
investor, and brokers typically exert great influence over customers' in-
vestment choices. Without a compulsory warning, a customer may be
influenced by his broker to express a preference for a risk which he does
not fully understand and which he is not really willing to undertake.
By incorporating the notion of risk threshold, suitability would be
defined with respect to both willingness and capacity of the customer
to bear risk.
64. Some might consider a warning inadequate and believe that only an absolute pro-
hibition would adequately protect investors. An absolute prohibition, however, might be
attacked on the ground that it interferes with consumer sovereignty by substituting the
risk preferences of the prudent or reasonable man for those of the investor In question,
To the extent that an absolute prohibition, if adopted, did interfere with the ability of
sovereign consumers to make imprudent or speculative investments, it would not be unlike
other laws which prohibit individuals from placing their resources in great jeopardy In
the hope of making a large gain, such as laws against gambling. It would be sup-
portable, if at all, on similar policy grounds, for example, to avoid the destitution of In-
dividuals who would otherwise be self-supporting. It could be argued, however, that
insofar as securities are concerned, a rule which attempts to substitute the prudent man's
desires for those of the investor in question may actually, in the long run, do more to
further individual desires than would a mere warning. Suppose that a compulsory warning
is insufficient to protect customers from undue broker influence, and that most Investors
will, if allowed to decide freely, make prudent choices. A rule which focuses on the
prudent man's desires, then, may only prohibit brokers from influencing their customers
to choose a risk that does not, in fact, reflect their true preferences.
If these suppositions are correct, the absolute prohibition, far from being a usurpation
of consumer sovereignty, seems instead a way of fortifying it against the possible distorting
influence of high-pressure securities salesmanship. If a compulsory warning is found to
protect investors inadequately, the SEC should seriously consider an absolute prohibition.
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4. Can Risk Be Regulated In Isolation From Return?
This article has thus far considered the decision to accept or reject
a given level of risk as if it could be made simply by comparing the
risk in question with the customer's risk threshold. A recent Note,
however, criticized this general approach:
[R]eturn as well as risk must be evaluated when deciding if an in-
vestment is imprudent. For a prudent private investor, the expected
return may more than offset the corresponding marginal increment
in risk resulting from [a purchase].05
[I]nvestors ... benefit from investments that increase the return to
a portfolio just as they are harmed by investments that increase its
risks. [Current regulation of risk] ignores this trade-off between
risk and return.., a larger expected return may more than off-set
the marginal risk a security adds to a portfolio. 0
[R]isk cannot be regulated without making a judgement about the
level of return that will justify a, certain level of risk.67
According to this critique, an investor is characterized not by his
attitude toward risk alone, but by the amount of return he demands for
assuming any given level of risk. When an investor is said to prefer "low
risks," therefore, this can only mean that he is unwilling to acquire most
high-risk and medium-risk portfolios available in the market, because he
considers the expected returns they offer insufficient to compensate him
for the higher risk they carry. A high-risk or medium-risk portfolio may
be acceptable to a so-called low-risk investor, however, if its expected
return is sufficiently large to compensate him for the higher risk in.
volved. The critique therefore suggests that regulation should compare
both the risk and expected return of the total portfolio recommended
65. Note, The Regulation of Risky Investments, 83 HAIw. L. R v. 603, 608 (1970).
66. Id. at 618.
67. Id. at 621. Contrary to the view expressed above, however, the rejection of certain
portfolios on the basis of risk alone is theoretically proper if it is believed that some risk
levels are never acceptable, no matter how much expected return they offer. For example,
suppose an investor has capital of $100,000 and is offered the chance to play the following
game. The investor is required to bet (i.e., to invest) his entire wealth of $100,000. There
are two possible outcomes, each with a probability of 50 per cent. Under outcome one,
the investor loses everything. Under outcome two, the investor wins and is entitled to re-
ceive any sum he wishes, no matter how large. The question is, how large a pay-off will
induce the investor to play the game? There are some investors who will not mind the
risk of losing everything because of the possibility of enormous gain. But there are other
individuals who prefer prudence to the risk of losing everything, no matter how large
the possible gain. The regulation of risk in isolation from return is tantamount to
assuming that a so-called low-risk prudent investor is unwilling to incur medium or
high risks, no matter how much return they promise, because the risk of loss is so great.
It may not be unreasonable to assume that prudent men-whoever they may be-are
especially concerned about the risk of loss and therefore will reject any portfolio whoze
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with the investor's individual risk-return preferences; or, at least, that a
broker-dealer should be allowed to defend a high-risk recommendation
to a so-called low-risk customer on the ground that the returns were
large enough to justify the high risk.
Such a critique is certainly theoretically superior to the view that
preferences toward risk are established without regard to expected re-
turn. Portfolio theory assumes that investors demand larger expected
returns for assuming higher risks, and it follows from this assumption
that the level of risk an investor is willing to bear will, in part, be a
function of the reward offered for risk-taking. It is possible, however,
to demonstrate that regulation with respect to risk alone is theoretically
consistent with the view that risk-taking is a function of expected return,
under a special set of conditions: if the efficient markets theory holds, all
efficiently diversified portfolios at any given level of risk can be expected
to produce the same amount of return. 8 Therefore, an investor will
either accept or reject all efficiently diversified portfolios at any given
level of risk, and it is possible to characterize investor preferences in
terms of the level of risk alone.
As noted above, it is not currently possible to say whether the efficient
markets theory accurately describes the behavior of all securities prices
for all investors. The evidence amassed in its support, however, does
indicate that in the overwhelming majority of cases, it is impossible to
identify and acquire undervalued securities or undervalued portfolios.
At any given point in time, then, the great majority of efficiently diversi-
fied portfolios can be expected to offer the same return at any given level
of risk. And, at least with respect to those portfolios, it is possible to
characterize investor preferences with respect to risk alone.
The regulation of risk in isolation from return remains theoretically
improper with respect to those (doubful) instances when a broker may
be able to identify and acquire undervalued portfolios which produce
an unusually high return at their level of risk. It may be argued that in
these instances, a broker should be allowed to defend a high-risk recom-
mendation to a so-called low-risk customer on the ground that the port-
folio recommended is so undervalued and produces such unusually high
returns that it is consistent with the customer's willingness and capacity
to bear risk. But let us examine this proposed defense more closely.
Would it be fair to allow the defense when a recommendation is
risk of loss exceeds some minimum threshold, regardless of the possible returns. See
D. FARRAR, THE INvEs ENT I DCION UNDER UNCERTAINTY 9-10 (1967).
68. See the discussion of the efficient markets theory at pp. 1614-17 supra.
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alleged to have exceeded the customer's willingness to bear risk? Sup-
pose a broker recommends a high-risk portfolio to a customer who ex-
presses a preference for a low-risk recommendation. Should the broker
be allowed to defend himself on the ground that the customer, in spite
of himself, would have been willing to assume the higher risk because of
the unusually high returns involved? Such a defense could be evaluated
only by determining what the customer would have said, had the broker
at the time of the recommendation asked him if he would be willing to
accept a high-risk recommendation which promised unusually high
returns. But how could an adjudicatory body determine this after the
fact? Clearly, in this instance, the broker should actually ask the cus-
tomer. It is the obligation of a broker, under the present suitability
rule, to inquire about his customer's preferences before making a
recommendation. He is forbidden from making a recommendation by
guessing about his customer's desires. For this reason our hypothetical
broker should not be allowed to defend a recommendation that is
inconsistent with the customer's stated preferences on the ground that
it is consistent with unstated, "real" preferences.
Is the proposed defense acceptable when a recommendation is alleged
to have exceeded the customer's capacity to bear risk? Suppose for exam-
ple that a broker recommends a high-risk portfolio to a customer of
limited financial means. Should he then be allowed to defend the recom-
mendation on the ground that even a prudent man in those circum-
stances would be willing to accept a high-risk portfolio, provided the
returns were unusually high? It seems clear that the defense would be
persuasive only where the broker is dearly able to identify and acquire
a significantly undervalued portfolio-a situation which is not common.
However, until doubts about the validity of the efficient markets the-
ory are resolved, the suitability rule should recognize this possibility
by allowing a broker to defend an allegedly risk-unsuitable recom-
mendation by presenting clear and convincing evidence that: 1) the
portfolio recommended was significantly undervalued and produced
an unusually high return for its level of risk, and 2) the return was
sufficiently high to justify acceptance by a prudent man of what would
ordinarily be an unsuitably high risk.
II. A Proposed Set of Suitability Rules
Based on the foregoing analysis, portfolio theory and the legal suit-
ability requirement should be integrated to produce the following
rules.
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1. Brokers should recommend a security only if there is a reasonable
basis for believing that its purchase will result in a risk which the cus-
tomer is willing and able to bear."0 In order to make this judgment, the
broker should compare the risk of the total portfolio which would result,
if the purchase is made, with the customer's risk threshold? 0 In no case
should risk suitability be judged with respect only to the individual
security recommended, apart from its effect on the customer's entire
portfolio of both risky and risk-free assets.
2. Brokers should, in good faith, recommend that risky portfolio
which they believe will produce the highest return per unit of risk, net
of transaction costs. Adjustment of the resulting risk to suitable levels
should be accomplished by varying the proportions of the customer's
total wealth between risky and risk-free portfolios.71
3. Whenever a broker recommends that a customer acquire a port-
folio consisting of more than twenty securities, that recommendation
will be deemed unsuitable unless the broker can show clear and con-
vincing evidence for believing that the increased benefits of further
diversification exceed the larger transaction costs incurred. This rule
shall not apply when the investor's holdings are sufficiently large that
transaction costs per dollar invested do not increase with the number of
holdings.
4. When a broker recommends the purchase of a security which
does not improve the efficiency of diversification, and the recommenda-
tion is not motivated by the investor's desire to hold his portfolio at a
different level of risk, the recommendation is unsuitable unless there
are reasonable grounds for believing that it will increase portfolio
return, net of transaction costs.
5. Should the theory of efficient markets become adequately estab-
lished, the following rule should replace Rule 4: When a broker
recommends the purchase of a security which does not improve the
efficiency of diversification, and the recommendation is not motivated
69. A broker should be allowed to justify a recommendation which exceeds the custo-
mer's capacity to bear risk, by presenting the defense discussed pp. 1623-25 supra.
70. See pp. 1621-22 supra. Risk threshold includes the customer's willingness and ca.
pacity to bear risk, where the latter is defined as the risk that a prudent or reasonable man
in the customer's circumstances would be willing to assume. This rule would not be an
absolute prohibition against a broker recommending a purchase that exceeded the In.
vestor's capacity to bear risk. If an investor persisted in requesting such a recommendation,
the rule would not prohibit the broker from making it, provided he first warned the
investor that the assumption of the risk was dangerous and unreasonable according
to what a prudent man would do.
71. For a discussion of the applicability of this rule in the non-risk-free assets case,
see note 79 infra.
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by the investor's desire to hold his portfolio at a different level of risk,
then i) any recommendation that the investor switch his investments is
per se unsuitable; and ii) any recommendation that the investor in-
crease the number of his holdings is unsuitable, unless the total amount
invested is sufficiently large that increasing the number of holdings
does not increase transaction costs per dollar invested.
A. Risk Suitability: Rule 1
This rule incorporates a central insight of portfolio theory: that risk
suitability should be judged with respect to the effect of a particular
investment on the investor's total portfolio, rather than solely in terms
of the particular investment's risk characteristics. A broker under Rule
1 would be required to make three determinations: first, he would
determine the customer's capacity and willingness to bear risk; second,
he would estimate the effect of the security's purchase on the risk
level of the customer's entire portfolio of both risky and risk-free
assets;7_2 third, he would compare the resulting degree of risk with the
customer's risk threshold, and make appropriate adjustments.va
Although the SEC has failed to announce explicit criteria for judging
risk suitability, its decisions and pronouncements have shown a prac-
tical awareness of the procedures outlined under Rule 1. The SEC
has recognized that the suitability of any purchase should be evaluated
by obtaining information concerning the customer's total financial
picture, including his investments in both risky and risk-free assets. 4
72. It should be noted that the purchase of a high-risk security v.ll not nece arily
increase the overall risk of a portfolio, provided that the high-risk security and the
portfolio react in sufficiently different ways to the same future events. See pp. 1611-13
and note 39 supra.
73. When risk-free assets are available, the broker should adopt the following
course of action if the degree of risk associated with the resulting total portfolio is
inconsistent with the customer's risk threshold. If the resulting total portfolio would be
too risky for the customer, then the broker should recommend the security only if he
simultaneously advises a decrease in the proportion of total wealth placed in the risky
portfolio. If the resulting total portfolio would carry too low a risk, then the broker
should recommend the security only if he, at the same time, advises an increase in the
proportion of wealth placed in the risky portfolio, through borrowing if necessary.
But if risk-free assets are not available, it is impossible to adjust for risk by -arying
the proportion of assets placed in the risky portfolio, and the broker-dealer should change
his recommendation to a different security or group of securities in order to bring the total
portfolio risk to a level consistent with the customer's risk threshold.
74. In Gerald M. Greenberg, 40 S.E.C. 13, 137-38 (1960), the SEC noted that the
broker had recommended the purchase of a security "without any knowledge of or attempt
to obtain information concerning the customer's other security holdings, his financial
situation, and his needs so as to be in a position to judge the suitability of recommenda-
tions." In SEC Release No. 34-7984 (October 25, 1,66), the SEC stated that brokers should
make inquiries concerning a customer's "savings and life insurance, and his security
holdings and other assets."
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Moreover, the SEC decisions appear to compare the customer's risk
threshold with the degree of risk associated with the total portfolio.15
Despite this general similarity of approach between portfolio theory
and SEC decisions, however, the SEC has itself recognized that further
definition of risk suitability would prove beneficial.73
One ambiguity is whether the suitability rule as presently enforced
by the SEC actually focuses on the customer's entire portfolio. 7 Because
of this uncertainty, brokers may hesitate to recommend an appropriate
combination of the best risky portfolio and risk-free assets or borrow.
ing, for fear that their recommendations may be scrutinized in terms
of the risk suitability of the risky portfolio alone, or even in terms of
the risk suitability of the particular security. If, for example, the best
risky portfolio carries a high degree of risk, brokers may fear to recom-
mend it, in combination with risk-free assets, to a low-risk investor.
Brokers may similarly hesitate to recommend a risky portfolio con-
taining both high-risk and low-risk securities for fear that risk suitability
may be judged with respect to the individual high-risk security recom-
mended, in isolation from the effect of this security on the total port-
folio.
To the extent this ambiguity exists regarding the meaning of risk
suitability, the suitability rule may have induced brokers to avoid
recommendation of efficient investments. Rule I would clarify the
current ambiguity.
B. Economic Suitability: Rules 2 through 5
Risk suitability as defined above is but one of the implications of
75. In Philips and Co., 37 S.E.C. 66 (1956), the SEC found a recommendation unsuitable
where a customer, "in limited financial circumstances," placed all his wealth, indudlng
borrowed funds, in a speculative security. In Richard N. Cea, SEC Release No. 34.866F
(August 6, 1969), the offending broker persuaded a widow in her late fifties, who earned
about fifty dollars per week take home pay, to sell her listed stocks and place all her
wealth in a highly speculative security.
76. In SEC REPoRT or SpzczAL STUmY OF SECumrrsI MARKEr 329 (1963), the SEC
stated:
Greater emphasis should be given by the commission and the self-regulatory bodies
to the concept of "suitability" of particular customers. The NASD, which has taken
leadership in this respect by adopting a general suitability rule, should provide
further definition of content.
77. The SEC decisions have never articulated any explicit criteria for determining
whether a recommendation involves a risk that is suitable for the customer in question.
There is simply a listing of the relevant facts and then a statement to the effect that the
recommendation was unsuitable. Because the facts recited by the SEC in the cases cited it
note 75 supra have included information concerning all of the customer's assets and liabill-
ties, the SEC appears to be comparing the customer's risk threshold with the risk associated
with the total portfolio as a result of the security recommended. However, because there Is
no explanation of what it is doing, the decisions might also be interpreted as simply coin-
paring the customer's risk threshold with the risk of the particular security recommended,
alone and in isolation from the rest of the customer's holdings.
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portfolio theory. While the theory argues that the customer's risk
threshold should correspond to the risk incurred on his total portfolio,
it does not suggest that all portfolios carrying that level of risk are
equally desirable. It assumes instead that the investor will always prefer
the total portfolio with the highest expected return for the degree of
risk that he is willing to assume. This assumption can be translated
into several kinds of suitability requirements concerning the economic
suitability of broker-dealer recommendations.
1. Rule 2: The Search for an Optimal Portfolio
No workable legal standard, as noted above, can impose on brokers
the duty to identify successfully the optimal portfolio of risky assets for
each customer. T7 Rule 2 is articulated in the interest of formulating a
general method of procedure for brokers along the lines suggested by
economic theory. A broker will have complied with Rule 2 if he can
evidence a good faith effort to recommend the best risky portfolio. Rule
2 states that he should, in good faith, recommend that risky portfolio
which yields the highest return per unit of risk, net of transaction costs.
Adjustment for risk suitability should then be accomplished by varying
the proportions of wealth held in risky and risk-free portfolios.70
Brokers will obviously recommend different "best" portfolios to
customers with different risk thresholds. The portfolios recommended
to customers with identical risk thresholds may also differ, however. For
one thing, brokers will differ as to the composition of a "best" portfolio,
being unable to agree on a uniquely defined optimum. Other reasons
for this difference emerge from portfolio theory itself. The composition
of the portfolio with the highest return per unit of risk may differ
from customer to customer as a function of at least three additional
factors. First, investors are primarily concerned with the after-tax
return per unit of risk. Tax-exempt securities, which produce too low
a return to justify their inclusion in the best portfolios of low- and
middle-income investors, may produce a high enough after-tax return
to justify their inclusion in the best portfolios of high-income inves-
tors.s0 Second, if transaction costs vary among investors, the same port-
folio may produce a different net return for different investors."'
78. See pp. 1620-21 supra.
79. See pp. 1609-11 supra. If brokers believe that risk-free assets are not available, they
should, in good faith, recommend those securities which will produce the highest return,
net of transaction costs, for the entire portfolio at the degree of risk which reflects the
customer's risk threshold. See notes 60, 73 supra.
80. R. BR~EArmY, supra note 18, at 121. See note 34 supra.
81. Id. For example, suppose that, without taking transaction costs into account, the
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Third, customers will vary in their holdings of non-security risky assets,
such as real estate or interests in unincorporated ventures. The best
portfolio of risky assets must be assessed in conjunction with these
non-security assets.
2. Rule 3: Diversification
The studies of decreasing returns to diversification indicate that
increasing the number of securities in a portfolio above twenty is
unlikely to improve portfolio efficiency more than negligibly.82 At the
same time, increasing the number of holdings will probably increase
transaction costs per dollar invested. 3 Any recommendation that an
investor increase his number of holdings beyond twenty should be
highly suspect, therefore, under the suitability rule.
This does not mean that any risky portfolio containing twenty or
more securities is efficiently diversified. The proportions in which
different securities are held and the degree to which their outcomes
are independent of each other also determine portfolio risk. A portfolio
in which 81 per cent is invested in one stock and 1 per cent is invested
in each of nineteen other stocks is not well-diversified. Nor is a portfolio
consisting of twenty different airline stocks likely to be efficient in re-
ducing overall risk, since the fortunes of all companies within any
single industry are significantly interrelated. If the portfolio holdings
are held in correct proportions and if they are as independent of one
another as possible, however, increasing the number of holdings beyond
twenty will bring a negligible benefit.
Whether an increase in holdings is suitable thus depends on the
type of transaction in question. If the investor is placing funds in
securities for the first time, then a portfolio of more than twenty
"best" portfolio is composed of five securities, while the second-best portfolio Is composed
of only three of those five securities. An investor with relatively limited funds may incur
significantly higher brokerage fees per dollar invested in the best portfolio, as compared
with the second-best portfolio, because of the high cost of odd-lot buying. Moreover, If
the difference in brokerage fees outweighs the greater return per unit of risk produced by
the best portfolio over the second-best portfolio, then the latter would actually be best
for the investor with limited funds, when transactions costs are taken into account, On the
other hand, a large institutional investor will purchase securities on a sufficient scale to
make the question of transaction costs immaterial. See note 45 supra.
82. See note 42 supra. None of these studies, however, attempted to take transaction
costs into account. Since the extra transaction costs are probably more than negligible,
it is likely that decreasing returns to diversification will be outweighed by Increasing
transaction costs at some level significantly below twenty holdings, perhaps as low as eight
or so. Thus, the number twenty which has been suggested for incorporation Into the legal
rule is almost surely too high. Further statistical studies, taking into account Increasing
transaction costs as well as decreasing returns, would probably enable a somewhat lower
figure to be incorporated into the rule.
83. See note 43 supra.
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securities is unlikely to be the best, and its recommendation should be
held suitable only if the investor's holdings are sufficiently large that
his transaction costs per dollar invested do not increase. When a pur-
chase involves the investment of additional funds or the switching of
funds already invested, there may be special circumstances which would
justify increasing the investor's holdings above twenty. If an investor's
existing portfolio is badly diversified, for example, an increase in the
number of holdings above twenty may improve the efficiency of diver-
sification. An investor whose initial portfolio contains twenty airline
stocks and who wishes to invest additional funds would be well advised
to buy the securities of a company in a completely unrelated area, al-
though this would increase the number of holdings above twenty. Or,
if an investor's portfolio consists of 81 per cent of one stock and I per
cent of nineteen others, it may be proper to advise him to switch the
81 per cent in the one stock to a number of different securities.84
Because such situations are imaginable, Rule 3 has been drafted to
provide a strong presumption against the suitability of any recom-
mendation that an investor acquire more than twenty holdings, while
allowing the broker a defense based on clear and convincing evidence
that his recommendation was suitable under the circumstances.
3. Rule 4: Bad Bargains And Churning
Portfolio theory assumes that investors demand to be compensated
for assuming risk. This assumption, in conjunction with the obvious
fact that investors prefer larger returns, can be translated into two
short maxims of investor behavior:
a) If two portfolios have the same risk and different expected
returns, then investors will always prefer the portfolio with the larger
return; and
b) If one portfolio has both a higher risk and a lower return than
a second portfolio, then investors will always prefer the second port-
folio.
84. The existence of transaction costs suggests other exceptions to the general rule im-
posing a ceiling of twenty holdings. Assume an investor holds an efficiently diversified
portfolio A with twenty securities, and later discovers a portfolio B which produces a
higher return than A at the same level of risk. Suppose further that the differential return
between A and B is less than the transaction costs of switching but greater than the in-
crease in transaction costs that would result from increasing the number of holdings by
investing any additional funds in portfolio B. In this circumstance, the investor should
not switch from portfolio A to portfolio B. But if he wishes to invest additional funds,
he should place them in portfolio B, even though such a choice would raise the number
of holdings above twenty. However, this situation is so unlikely that it may be ignored for
practical purposes when implementing Rule 3.
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These maxims can easily be combined into Rule 4: when a broker-
dealer recommends a security that does not decrease over-all portfolio
risk, the recommendation is suitable only if there are reasonable
grounds for believing that it will increase portfolio return, net of
transaction costs.
Rule 4 is concerned with recommendations that may be risk-suitable
but of no economic advantage to the customer. A recommendation may
violate Rule 4 in two different ways. First, if the return on the security
recommended is less than the return on the existing portfolio, its ac-
quisition will obviously fail to increase portfolio return. Second, even
if the new security produces a higher return than the existing portfolio,
transaction costs may be so great that not even the highest reasonable
estimate of the security's expected addition to portfolio return would
justify its purchase.
As to the second situation, Rule 4 dovetails with the SEC's applica.
tion of the suitability rule to "churning" cases, where a broker engages
in excessive trading in a customer's account in order to generate com-
missions for himselfYs  Under current SEC law, a finding of unsuit-
ability in cases of "churning" implies that no reasonable basis existed
for believing that the securities purchased would produce an economic
advantage sufficient to offset the broker's commission."0
4. Rule 5: The Impact of The Theory of Efficient Markets
The substance of Rule 4 can be given further significance when
integrated with the theory of efficient markets. Rule 5 is proposed to
replace Rule 4, if the theory of efficient markets becomes adequately
established. Consider the situation where a small investor who is effi-
ciently diversified and who has no desire to change the level of risk of
his portfolio places additional funds in securities. If the investor
decides to increase his number of holdings, transaction costs per dollar
invested will probably increase8 7 The acquisition will be suitable
under Rule 4 only if the net return of the portfolio increases. Thus the
new portfolio resulting from the increase in the number of holdings
must produce a higher return than the existing efficiently diversified
85. See note 14 supra.
86. In Thomas Arthur Stewart, 20 S.E.C. 196, 201 (1945). the SEC stated:
In view of the selling load included in the purchase price, in-and.out trading In
the subject shares could be profitable only . . . if a purchase were followed by a
market appredation of the portfolio or an increase in the fund's net current assets
sufficient to exceed the selling load of 8 per cent to 9Y per cent.
87. See note 43 supra.
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portfolio. This can occur only if the new portfolio is undervalued by
the market, relative to the existing portfolio.
In a second case, where an investor who holds an efficiently diversified
portfolio is advised to switch his investments, transaction costs are
similarly increased.88 This cost increase can be justified under Rule 4
only if the new portfolio yields more, net, at the same level of risk,
i.e. if the new portfolio is undervalued by the market relative to the
existing efficiently diversified portfolio.
The consequences which follow if the theory of efficient markets is
accepted should be apparent, since the contribution of that theory is its
judgment that it is impossible to identify and acquire undervalued
securities.
Rule 5 therefore would prohibit broker-dealers from recommending
either: i) an increase in the number of holdings through the investment
of additional funds to an investor who is efficiently diversified, unless his
holdings are sufficiently large that his transaction costs per dollar do not
increases as his number of holdings increases; or ii) the switching of
already invested funds to any investor who is efficiently diversified. The
only valid exception to this prohibition would be the case where an
investor has changed his investment objectives and wishes to hold his
portfolio at a different level of risk.s9
III. Conclusion
Under rules of the SEC and NASD, a broker-dealer in the securities
market may recommend a security for purchase only when there is a
reasonable basis for believing that its acquisition would be suitable for
the customer in question. Neither the SEC, the NASD, nor the courts,
however, have attempted to define "suitable" or to articulate definite
criteria for judging the suitability of a particular investment for a given
customer.
Over the past fifteen years, academic economists have produced a. con-
88. Id.
89. The study of Scholes, supra note 54, indicates that it may be possible to identify
and acquire undervalued securities on the basis of inside information. Therefore, the
effident markets theory, in one form, maintains only that it is impossible to identify and
acquire undervalued securities on the basis of publicly available information. See Fama,
Effident Capital Markets, supra note 48, at 383, 414. This may suggest that a suitability
rule based on the effident markets theory, such as Rule 5, should allow an exception for
recommendations based on inside information. In view of the prohibition against the use
of inside information by SEC Rule lOb-5, however, it would hardly be appropriate for a
suitability rule to make such an exception.
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siderable body of theoretical and empirical literature in a search for
definite criteria for judging the advisability or "suitability" of any in-
vestment. Economic research has made five basic contributions to a
theory of investment choice. First, it emphasizes that the investor should
choose a total portfolio consistent with his willingness and capacity to
bear risk, rather than focusing simply on the extent to which individual
securities in isolation pose acceptable risks.
Second, it demonstrates that, when risk-free assets exist, the most
efficient way to adjust for risk is by varying the proportion of total wealth
placed in risky and risk-free assets. Third, it indicates that the investor
should always choose that total portfolio which produces the highest
return for the level of risk consistent with his risk threshold. Fourth, the
theory of diversification demonstrates that the optimal portfolio will
typically consist of a number of securities rather than any single best
security, but that after a certain number, at most twenty, increasing
the number of holdings in a portfolio produces only a negligible bene-
fit. Fifth, the efficient markets theory postulates that investors are un-
able to identify and acquire undervalued securities.
The economic theory of portfolio selection is based on a number
of assumptions which initially appear too unrealistic to justify its
incorporation into a workable legal standard. But, on closer exami.
nation, such objections prove unimportant, and for all practical pur-
poses portfolio theory provides an accurate description of the market
for securities.
The most serious limitation on the usefulness of portfolio theory for
the suitability rule is that there is no way of determining, on the basis
of either an objective test or subjective judgment, what is at any given
point in time the best portfolio for a particular investor. Therefore, the
legal suitability rule cannot command recommendation of a single
optimal portfolio. Despite this limitation, it is possible to give the pre-
sent suitability rule considerable definitional content, extending govern-
mental protection of investors in the securities markets by integrating
the insights of theoretical and empirical research with the legal standard.
One possible objection to interpreting legal suitability in the light of
economic theory is that it will make brokers' services more expensive.
Portfolio theory, after all, is concerned with the risk-return attributes
of the investor's entire portfolio, which includes not only his security
investments, but his home, savings account, job prospects, and other
significant non-security assets and liabilities. This means that a broker,
operating under the suitability rule advocated here, would have to ob-
tain complete information about each customer and analyze the data
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before making a recommendation. This would doubtless entail some
increase in the price of brokers' services.
In part the expense of obtaining information about each customer's
financial background could be minimized. Most of the necessary data
about an investor's existing portfolio could be obtained from a standard
form requesting vital statistics about a customer's job, securities, non-
security assets, liabilities, and other pertinent information. There
would remain, however, the task of analyzing data from the form, and
this procedure might be costly.
Such costs, however large, must be weighed against the substantial
benefits which an expanded suitability rule would provide to the
average investor. Implementation of the risk and economic suitability
rules proposed would afford the investing public two sorts of benefits.
First, the risk suitability standard, both as now enforced by the SEC and
NASD, and as proposed, would protect investors from the unknowing
assumption of imprudent risks, and from high-pressure securities sales-
manship. Second, the economic suitability rules would prevent brokers
from making recommendations which increase transaction costs without,
on balance, improving the investor's position.
The suitability rules described above would employ the findings of
theoretical and empirical economics to proscribe practices harmful to
the average investor which are permissible under current law, and
would give meaning to the currently inchoate policy requiring "suit-
able" investment recommendations. For these reasons the rules pro-
posed here deserve the serious consideration of SEC and NASD policy
makers.
90. According to Mundheim, supra note 7, at 474 n.86, such a form is now in use.
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